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1 Model solution and stability
This appendix contains the derivations of all results discussed in the main
text. Equations without the ‘A ’ preﬁx refer to equations in the main text.
1.1 Derivation of equations (18) and (22)
In the absence of capital ﬂows, the current account is balanced at any time
and total expenditure En = pnnnxn. Making use of the resource constraints
total spending evolves according to
.
E
n
En
=
.
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n
pn
¡ a
.
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(Hn ¡ ag) ¡
.
a
h
a
h
. (A.1)
From the monopoly pricing condition and the unit cost function (10), we can
express the relative change in the price in terms of relative changes in the
factor rewards w
h
and w
l
. The ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization of
a Northern ﬁrm and the factor market clearing condition gives us the relative
wage rate prevailing in the North:
ω ´ w
n
l
wn
h
=
1¡ bn
bn

Hn ¡ ag
Ln
¸
1−v
n
. (A.2)
Diﬀerentiate the equation of the valuation of ﬁrms from the supply side (11)
with respect to time and use (A.2), we obtain
.
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.
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h
)
σ
a
.
g
(Hn ¡ ag) . (A.3)
Note, Án
h
= (b
n
)
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w
n1−σ
n
h
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n
)
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h
+ (1¡ b
n
)
σ
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w
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l
], with ¾n = 1=(1¡
º
n
). Using (A.2), φn
h
can also be expressed in terms of the exogenous factor
supply.
The last part of the right hand side of (A.1) is obtained as follows. Using
Shephard’s Lemma we calculate the optimal capital input per unit of output
from the unit cost function (10), say an
h
. Together with (A.2)
.
a
h
a
h
= ¡ (1¡ φ
n
h
)a
(Hn ¡ ag)
.
g . (A.4)
Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) and the resulting expression into (17)
yields the diﬀerential equation (18) as given in the main text.
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Here we derive (22) of the main text. Multiply the resource constraints
(15) and (16) with their corresponding factor rewards and combined with (3)
yields
cn
cs
nn
ns

pn
ps
¶
−ε
=
wn
h
ws
h

(Hn ¡ ag) + ωnLn
Hs + ωsLs
¸
. (A.5)
Substitute (A.2) into (A.5) and recall the deﬁnition of ζ, we obtain an equa-
tion for the terms of trade:
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b
s
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n
¢
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s
)(L
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)
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s
)
1/ν
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(bn(Hn−ag)νn+(1−bn)(Ln)νn)
1/ν
n
¸
1/ε
. (A.6)
We require the unit cost to be relatively smaller in the South implying that
(A.6) must be greater than cn/csα. Solving for the rate of innovation provides
condition (22).
1.2 Stability of the model
We start by log-linearizing equations (15) and (16) given in the main text
and here reproduced for convenience:
.
ζ= g ¡ (g +m)ζ
.
g=

Hn ¡ ag
a(1¡ φn
l
νn)
¶
g + ρ +m¡

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α
¶
(Hn ¡ ag)
aφn
h
1
ζ
¸
.
The log-linearized system written in matrix form is:"
.eζ (t)
.eg (t)
#
= J
 eζ(t)eg(t)
¸
+
"
¡m
(H
n
−ag)m
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)g
#
[em(t)] , (A.7)
where
J =
"
¡(g +m) m
(g + ρ+m) (H
n
−ag)
a(1−φ
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l
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n
)g
g+ρ+m
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
©
φn
h
(νn+ α
1−α
ζ) + (1¡ νn)ª
#
,
and the Jacobian is evaluated around the initial steady state and whereeζ(t) ´ dζ(t)/ζ, eg(t) ´ dg(t)/g, em ´ dm(t)/m, .eζ (t) ´ .ζ (t)/ζ, .eg (t) ´ .g (t)/g,
(where we have used d
.
ζ=
.
ζ, and d
.
g´ .g). We deﬁne the 2 by 2 matrix of
the endogenous variables by ∆ and its elements by a
ij
; the elements of the
column vector of the exogenous term are denoted by δ
i
, i = m, g. Let λ
1
> 0
and ¡λ
2
< 0 be the roots of the characteristic equation of ∆. Recall that
an equilibrium is saddle point stable when the roots of the characteristic
2
equation are of diﬀerent sign; i.e. λ
1
> 0 and λ
2
> 0. The characteristic
roots are
λ
1
=
tr∆+
p
(tr∆)
2
−4|∆|
2
λ
2
=
tr∆−
p
(tr∆)
2
−4|∆|
2
,
where λ
2
denotes the speed of adjustment of the economy, j ∆ j= ¡λ
1
λ
2
,
and the tr∆ = λ
1
¡ λ
2
. Using (A.7), the determinant of ∆ can be written in
most general terms as
j ∆ j= ¡ (g+m+ρ)
(1−φn
l
ν
n)
½
(g +m)
£
φn
h
(νn+ α
1−α
ζ) + (1¡ νn)¤+m(Hn ¡ ag)
ag
¾
.
To show that the equilibrium is saddle point stable we have to show that
the determinant is negative. We proceed by showing that the determinant is
negative for all values of νn 2 (¡1, 1].
Case 1: νn = 1 (σ =1)
j ∆ j= ¡ (g +m+ ρ)
n
(g +m) (1+ α
1−α
ζ) +m (H
n
−ag)+(1−b)L
n
bag
o
< 0.
Case 2: νn = 0 (σ = 1)
j ∆ j= ¡ (g +m+ ρ)
n
(g +m)
£
b
1−b
α
1−α
ζ + 1
¤
+m (H
n
−ag)
ag
o
< 0.
Case 3: νn = ¡1 (σ = 0)
j ∆ j= ¡ (g +m+ ρ)
½
(g +m)(
α
1¡ αζ + 1) +m
(H
n
−ag)
ag
¾
< 0,
iﬀ Ln/(Hn ¡ ag) > 1, and where we used the fact that
lim
v
n
→−∞
φn
l
νn = 0.
Hence the roots alternate in sign, and with λ
1
> 0 and λ
2
> 0 the equilibrium
is a saddle point. 
1.3 Model solution
We solve (A.7) by using Laplace transforms as suggested by Judd (1982, 1999)
and further developed by Bovenberg & Heijdra (2001) and Heijdra (1999).
In general, the Laplace transform Lf ef, sg of a function ef(t) is deﬁned by
Lf ef, sg = Z ∞
0
exp(¡st) ef(t)dt.
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The Laplace transform can therefore be interpreted as the present value dis-
counted at rate s. We use the following expression for the Laplace transform
of the time derivative of a function
.ef (t):
Lf
.ef, sg = Z ∞
0
exp(¡st)
.ef (t)dt = sLf ef, sg¡ ef(0).
Applying the Laplace transform to (A.7) yields
sLfeζ, sg¡ eζ(0)
sLfeg, sg¡ eg(0)
¸
= ∆

Lfeζ, sg
Lfeg, sg
¸
+

δ
m
δ
g
¸
Lfem, sg (A.8)
which implies that
Λ(s)
Lfeζ, sg
Lfeg, sg =
 eζ(0) + δ
m
Lfem, sgeg(0) + δ
g
Lfem, sg
¸
, (A.9)
where we deﬁne Λ(s) ´ sI ¡∆, and j Λ(s) j= (s¡ λ
1
)(s+ λ
2
).
Note, the rate of innovation, g, is a non-predetermined variable while
the number of varieties not yet imitated, ζ, is a predetermined variable and
consequently is not allowed to jump, i.e. eζ(0) = 0. Hence, The only unknown
in (A.9) is the size of the jump in the rate of innovation at time 0, eg(0). To
ﬁnd the initial jump in the rate of innovation, we use the condition that
Lfeζ, sg and Lfeg, sg are bounded for s = λ
1
. This implies that the right
hand side of (A.9) should be zero for s = λ
1
> 0. Premultiplying (A.9) by
adjΛ(λ
1
), the adjoint matrix of Λ(λ
1
), gives:
adjΛ(λ
1
)

δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
geg(0) + δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g
¸
=

0
0
¸
. (A.10)
The system of equations in (A.10) provides two equivalent conditions for the
jump in eg on impact. This follows from the fact that since λ
1
is an eigenvalue,
the two equations are not independent. As a consequence we have a unique
expression for eg(0) expressed in two alternative ways:1
eg(0) = ¡δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g¡

λ
1
¡ a
22
a
12
¶
δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
g (A.11)
eg(0) = ¡δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g¡

a
21
λ
1
¡ a
11
¶
δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
g. (A.12)
1
See, for example, Judd (1999) page 459.
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We can use either expression to eliminate eg(0) from (A.9) and derive the
general perfect foresight solution of the model in terms of Laplace transforms.
Premultiplying (A.9) by the inverse of Λ(s) and making use of
(sI ¡∆)−1 = adjΛ(s)/ j Λ(s) j
adjΛ(s) = adj(λ
i
) + (s¡ λ
i
)I for i = 1, 2
in combination with (A.10) yields:
(s+ λ
2
)

Lfeζ, sg
Lfeg, sg
¸
= adjΛ(λ
1
)
24 δm hL{em,s}−L{em,λ1}(s−λ1) i
δ
g
h
L{em,s}−L{em,λ
1
}
(s−λ
1
)
i 35
+

δ
m
Lfem, sgeg(0) + δ
g
Lfem, sg
¸
.
(A.13)
The long-run eﬀects of tighter IPRs, em(1), are obtained from (A.13) by
applying the ﬁnal-value theorem (Spiegel, 1965, p.20).
eg(1) ´ lim
s→0
sLfeg, sg = em(∞)
λ
1
λ
2
[a
11
δ
g
¡ a
21
δ
m
]
eζ(1) ´ lim
s→0
sLfeζ, sg = em(∞)
λ
1
λ
2
[a
22
δ
m
¡ a
12
δ
g
] .
(A.14)
By doing the appropriate substitution for a
ij
and δ
i
from (A.7) yields equa-
tions (28) and (30) in the main text.
By applying the initial value theorem (see Spiegel, 1965, p. 20) we can
determine the initial development of the time rate of change in the rate of
innovation and of the share of Northern products not yet imitated due to the
shock:
.eg (0) = lim
s→∞
sLf
.eg, sg = lim
s→∞
s [sLfeg, sg¡ eg(0)]
= δ
g
em(0)¡ a
21
δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
g¡ (λ
1
¡ a
11
)δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g
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g
em(0)¡ a
21
h
(λ
1
−a
11
)
a
21
δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g+ δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
g
i
.eg (0) = δ
g
em(0) + (λ
1
¡ a
11
)eg(0).
.eζ (0) = lim
s→∞
sLf
.eζ, sg = lim
s→∞
s2Lfeζ, sg
= δ
m
em(0)¡ a
12
h
(λ
1
−a
22
)
a
12
δ
m
Lfem,λ
1
g+ δ
g
Lfem,λ
1
g
i
.eζ (0) = δ
m
em(0) + a
12
eg(0).
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Making use of the appropriate substitutions for the Cobb-Douglas case results
in the expressions used in the main text.
In order to calculate the transition paths for the rate of innovation and
the number of varieties not yet imitated, the intertemporal path of em(t) has
to be speciﬁed. Inspired by Bovenberg & Heijdra (2001), we consider the
case in which tighter intellectual property rights can be either abruptly or
gradually implemented. The discussion in the main text makes use of the
following parametrization:
em(t) = (e−βt ¡ 1)κ, (A.15)
where β, κ > 0. The Laplace transform of em(t) is
Lfem, sg¡ Lfem,λ
1
g
(s¡ λ
1
)
=
κ
sλ
1
¡ κ
(s+ β)(β + λ
1
)
. (A.16)
It is helpful to recognize that
1
(s+β)(s+λ
2
)
= 1
(λ
2
−β)
h
1
(s+β)
¡ 1
(s+λ
2
)
i
1
s(s+λ
2
)
= 1
λ
2
h
1
s
¡ 1
(s+λ
2
)
i
.
(A.17)
By substituting (A.16) into (A.13) and inverting the Laplace transform we
calculate the transition path for the number of varieties not yet imitated and
the rate of innovation in the time domain as:
Lfeζ, sg
Lfeg, sg
¸
=

0eg(0)
¸
1
(s+λ
2
)
+ adjΛ(0)κ
λ
1
λ
2

δ
m
δ
g
¸
λ
2
(s+λ
2
)s
¡adjΛ(0)κ
(λ
1
+β)

δ
m
δ
g
¸
1
(s+λ
2
)(s+β)
+ βκ
(β+λ
1
)
I

δ
m
δ
g
¸
1
(s+λ
2
)(s+β)
,
where I is the identity matrix. Inverting the Laplace transform gives eζ(t)eg(t)
¸
=

0eg(0)
¸
[1 + A(λ
2
, t)]¡
 eζ(1)eg(1)
¸
A(λ
2
, t)
¡ κ
(β+λ
1
)
[adjΛ(0)¡ βI]

δ
m
δ
g
¸
T (β, λ
2
, t).
6
Making use of (A.14) we get alternatively
eζ(t) = ¡ heζ(1)iA(λ
2
, t) + κ
(λ
1
+β)
f(a
22
+ β)δ
m
¡ a
12
δ
g
gT (β, λ
2
, t),
eg(t) = eg(0) [1 + A(λ
2
, t)]¡ eg(1)A(λ
2
, t)
+ κ
(λ
1
+β)
f(a
11
+ β)δ
g
¡ a
21
δ
m
gT (β, λ
2
, t),
(A.18)
where A represents a single adjustment term given by
A(λ
2
, t) ´ (e−λ2t ¡ 1)
and T denotes a single transition term given by
T =
8<:
e
−βt
−e
−λ
2
t
λ
2
−β
for β 6= λ
2
,
te−λ2t for β = λ
2
.
(A.19)
The properties of A(λ
2
, t) and T (β, λ
2
, t) are as follows.
Lemma 1 Let
A(α
1
, t) ´ (e−α1t ¡ 1),
with α
1
> 0 and the following properties:
(i) A(α
1
, t) < 0 for t 2 (0,1),
(ii) A(α
1
, 0) = 0 for t = 0,
(iii) lim
t→∞
[A(α
1
, t)] = ¡1,
(iv) dA(α
1
, t)/dt  0,
(v) A(α
1
, t) converges towards a unit step function u(t) for α
1
!1.
Proof. Property (i), (ii), and (iii) are derived by substitution. Property
(iv) follows from dA(α
1
, t)/dt = ¡α
1
e−α1t and the assumption that α
1
> 0.
Property (v) follows comparing the Laplace transforms of u(t) and A(α
1
, t)
for α
1
! 1. The Laplace transform of u(t) is Lfu(t), sg = ¡1/s and the
Laplace transform of A(α
1
, t) is LfA(α
1
, t), sg = 1/(α
1
+ s) ¡ 1/s. For
α
1
!1 property (v) is satisﬁed. 
The properties of T (β, λ
2
, t), the single transition function, are identical
to those discussed in Bovenberg & Hijdra (2001), Lemma A.2.
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The jump in the rate of innovation that occurs at impact is derived by
using either (A.11) or (A.12) in combination with (A.15):
eg(0) = β
(β + λ
1
)λ
1

δ
g
+

λ
1
¡ a
22
a
12
¶
δ
m
¸
κ (A.20)
eg(0) = β
(β + λ
1
)λ
1

δ
g
+

a
21
λ
1
¡ a
11
¶
δ
m
¸
κ (A.21)
Making use of the deﬁnition of a
ij
, δ
m
, and δ
g
, the equations in the main
text are derived.
Lemma 2 λ
1
> ρ.
Proof. The deﬁnition of the a
ij
coeﬃcients and
λ
1
=
1
2
[a
11
+ a
22
+ C] where
C =
£
(a
11
+ a
22
)2 ¡ 4 (a
11
a
22
¡ a
21
a
12
)
¤
1/2
imply
¡ (a
11
a
22
¡ a
21
a
12
) > ρ [ρ¡ (a
11
+ a
22
)] .
The left hand side of the last inequality represents the determinant, while
the second term in the bracket on the right hand side denotes the trace.
We previously established that j ∆ j< 0 and tr∆ > 0 for νn 2 (¡1, 1].
By substituting the expressions for the a
ij
coeﬃcients from (A.7) into this
inequality establishes that the left hand side is positive while the right hand
side is negative. It follows that λ
1
> ρ.
1.3.1 Proof that North’s terms of trade improve
Log-linearize (A.6)
˜
ε
³
p
n
p
s
(t)
´
=
1
(1¡ ζ)
eζ(t) + φnhag
(Hn ¡ ag)eg(t)
and make use of (A.14) yields
˜
ε
³
p
n
p
s
(1)
´
= κm
λ
1
λ
2
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)(1−ζ)
£
n
(g + ρ+m)
³
φn
h
(νn + α
(1−α)
[ζ + 1]) + (1¡ νn)
´
¡ (1¡ ζ)φn
h
ρ
o
.
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It is tedious but straightforward to show that
ρ
h³
φn
h
(νn + α
(1−α)
[ζ + 1]) + (1¡ νn)
´
¡ (1¡ ζ)φn
h
i
> 0,
ρ
£
(1¡ φn
h
)(1¡ νn) + α+ζ
1−α
φ
h
¤
> 0.
This proves that North’s terms of trade improve in the long run when intel-
lectual property rights are tightened. 
1.4 Proof of Proposition 1
In this part of the appendix we characterize the paths of the rate of innovation
and the share of Northern varieties not yet imitated. For this purpose we
derive expressions for the time rate of change in these variables. Using (A.13)
and (A.15) in combination with (A.17), the time path for the rate of change
in the share of Northern goods not yet imitated yields
Lf
.eζ, sg ´ sLfeζ, sg = βκ
β+λ
1
h
δ
m
(λ
1
−a
22
)+δ
g
a
12
λ
1
¡ δm(β+a22)+δga12
s+β
i h
1
s+λ
2
i
(A.22)
In a similar way, the time path for the rate of change in the rate of innovation
is calculated to be
Lf
.eg, sg ´ sLfeg, sg¡ eg(0) =
= βκ
(β+λ
1
)λ
1
h
a
22
[a
21
δ
m
+(λ
2
+a
22
)δ
g
]
λ
2
+a
22
+ [a21δm−(a11+β)δg]λ1
s+β
i h
1
s+λ
2
i
,(A.23)
where we use the relations (λ
1
¡ a
22
)/a
12
= a
21
/(λ
1
¡ a
11
) = a
21
/(λ
2
+ a
22
).
By means of (A.22) and (A.23) we are now in the position to prove Propo-
sition 1. Non-monotonicity in the adjustment path of eg and eζ requires that
the sign in these rate of changes do switch along the adjustment path.
Lemma 3 Let the Laplace transform F (s) corresponding to a function f (t)
be (Note, Lemma 3 is identical to Lemma A.6 in Bovenberg and Heijdra
(2001), p. 10 and is here reproduced for convenience):
F (s) ´ A1
(s+ α
1
)
+
A
2
(s+ α
1
)(s + α
2
)
,
where α
1
> 0, α
2
> 0 and A
1
> 0.
Then the sign of f(t) is as follows:
(i) A
2
¸ 0 ) f(t) ¸ 0.
(ii) A
2
< 0 and (α
1
¡ α
2
)(A1
A
2
+ 1) < 0 ) f(t) ¸ 0 for t 2 [0,1).
(iii) A
2
< 0 and (α
1
¡ α
2
)(A1
A
2
+ 1) > 0 ) f(t) ¸ 0 for t 2 [0, t] and
f(t)  0 for t 2 [t,1).
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Proof. The inverse of F (s) is (see Spiegel (1965) p. 5):
f(t) = A
1
e−α1t + A
2
T (α
1
, α
2
, t),
where
T =
8<:
e
−α
2
t
−e
−α
1
t
α
1
−α
2
for α
1
6= α
2
,
te−α1t for α
1
= α
2
.
Part (i) of the Lemma follows straightforward if A
2
> 0. We prove part (ii)
and (iii) of Lemma 4 by deriving the condition under which f(t) cuts the
t-axis. The t, say t, for which f(t) = 0 amounts to:
t =
8><>:
1
α
1
−α
2
ln
h
(α
2
¡ α
1
)A1
A
2
+ 1
i
for α
1
6= α
2
,
¡A1
A
2
for α
1
= α
2
.
As a result, there exists a t <1 iﬀ (α
2
¡ α
1
)A1
A
2
+ 1 > 0. 
We can now use Lemma 3 in order to prove Proposition 1. For Proposition
1(i) to hold we have to show that the inverted terms in square brackets in
(A.23) are functions of time that change sign for t 2 [0,1). Lemma 3 shows
that we can establish the non-monotonicity property by using the Laplace
transform of f(t) directly. The F (s) function when applied to (A.23) has
elements α
1
= λ
2
and α
2
= β and
A
1
= a22[a21δm+(λ2+a22)δg]
λ
2
+a
22
,
A
2
= [a
21
δ
m
¡ (a
11
+ β)δ
g
]λ
1
.
By making the appropriate substitutions we ﬁnd that the signs of
A
1
= (H
n
ag)m
ag(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
h
(g+m+ρ)
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
φn
h
α
1−α
ζ + λ
2
i
a
22
λ
2
+a
22
> 0,
A
2
= ¡ (Hnag)m
ag(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
(ρ+ β)λ
1
< 0.
Applying Lemma 3(iii) it is straightforward to show that the adjustment path
of the rate of innovation is non-monotonic. If the policy shock is introduced
abruptly, i.e. β !1, then
F (s) =
1
(λ
2
+ a
22
)(λ
2
+ s)
[a
22
a
21
δ
m
¡ (λ
2
+ a
22
)δ
g
(λ
1
¡ a
22
)] < 0
implying monotonic adjustment for the path of the rate of change in the
rate of innovation. This proves part (i) of Proposition 1. Analogously, the
relevant F (s) function for (A.22) has elements α
1
= λ
2
and α
2
= β and
10
A
1
= δm(λ1−a22)+δga12
λ
1
A
2
= ¡ [δ
m
(β + a
22
) + δ
g
a
12
] .
Using the relations (λ
1
¡a
22
)/a
12
= a
21
/(λ
1
¡a
22
) and Lemma 2, it is straight-
forward to show that
A
1
=
(Hn ¡ ag)
a(1¡ φn
l
νn)g
a
12
(λ
1
¡ ρ)
λ
1
(λ
1
+ g +m)
> 0.
With regards to the sign of the coeﬃcient A
2
we have to look at the limits.
For νn = 1,
A
2
= m

β + (b(H
n
−ag)+(1−b)L
n
)
abg

(
1¡ α
α
)(g +m) + (g ¡m)
¶¸
> 0.
For νn = 0,
A
2
= m
h
β + (H
n
−ag)
ag
³
(1−α
α
) (g+m)
b
+ (g−(1−b)m)
(1−b)
´i
> 0.
For νn = ¡1,
A
2
= m
h
β + (H
n
−ag)
ag
¡
(1−α
α
)(g +m) + (g ¡m)¢i > 0.
Assuming continuity, Lemma 3(i) applies indicating that the adjustment path
of the share of Northern goods not yet imitated must be monotonic. This
proves part (ii) of Proposition 1. 
2 Welfare analysis of tighter intellectual prop-
erty rights
In this section, the welfare implications of tighter intellectual property rights
are derived. The utility of an agent at time t = 0, the time the shock occurs,
takes the form:
U
i
(0) =
Z
∞
0
e−ρτ log u
i
(τ)dτ,
where instantaneous utility is characterized by a CES function:
u
i
(t) =
"Z
n(t)
0
x(j)αdj
#
1/α
. (A.24)
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It is well known that given the CES preference structure life-time utility of
household i in region k can be rewritten in terms of aggregate spending E
and price index P :
Uk
i
(0) =
Z
∞
0
log
£
ϕk
i
Ek(τ )/P (τ )
¤
exp [¡ρτ ] dτ, (A.25)
where
ϕk
i
´ w
k
l
Lk
i
+ wk
h
Hk
i
wk
l
Lk + wk
h
Hk
with
X
I
k
i=1
ϕk
i
= 1
represents the factor income share of individual i in region k. Total spending
of the North and the South consists of the following components. The North
derives income from human capital, labor and proﬁts. Proﬁts are generated
from ﬁrms producing in the North and are equal to (1 ¡ α) of revenues.
Together, total spending in the North reads
En = wn
l
Ln + wn
h
Hn + nnπn (A.26)
= α−1 [ωnLn +Hn ¡ (1¡ α)ag] ,
where (1¡α)ag/α are savings. Combining the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt
maximization and the factor market equilibrium conditions the relative wage
in the North, ωn ´ wn
l
/wn
h
is
ωn =

1¡ b
b
¶
Hn ¡ ag
Ln
¶
1−ν
n
.
It is helpful to recognize that the share of human capital in the production
of any variety is deﬁned by
φn
h
=
b(Hn ¡ ag)νn
b(Hn ¡ ag)νn + (1¡ b)(Ln)νn .
Similarly, total spending in the South consists of income derived from un-
skilled labor and human capital:
Es = ωsLs +Hs,
where the relative wage in the South is
ωs ´ w
s
l
ws
h
=

1¡ bs
bs
¶
Hs
Ls
¶
1−ν
s
.
Note, we choose as numeraire wn
h
= ws
h
= 1. The price index P , in turn, is
given by
P = n1/1−ε
£
ζ(pn)1−ε + (1¡ ζ)(ps)1−ε¤1/1−ε . (A.27)
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Substitute (A.26) and (A.27) into (A.25) and utility of individual i located
in the North reads
log un
i
= log [Hn + ωnLn ¡ (1¡ α)ag] + 1
ε−1
log n
+ 1
ε−1
log

ζ + (1¡ ζ)
³
p
n
p
s
´
ε−1
¸
+ logϕn
i
+
¡ 1
1−σ
n
log
£
(b)σ
n
+ (1¡ b)σn(ωn)1−σn¤ .
The ﬁrst bracketed term on the right hand side denotes the eﬀect of factor
income and of savings on the current utility ﬂow. The second expression cap-
tures the availability of varieties. The third term represents the production
reallocation and terms of trade eﬀect. The fourth expression represents the
eﬀect of the income share on the utility ﬂow; the larger the share in total
income the higher is utility from consumption. The last term denotes the
change in the production cost. The ﬁrst three terms were already introduced
in diﬀerent form by Helpman (1993). The inclusion of a second factor re-
quires that the ﬂow of utility accounts for the relative wage rate, the income
share and production cost on the ﬂow of consumption.
Similarly for an individual in the South:
log us
i
= logϕs
i
+ log [Hs + ωsLs] +
1
ε¡ 1 logn¡ log p
s
+
1
ε¡ 1 log

ζ
³
p
n
p
s
´
1−ε
+ (1¡ ζ)
¸
.
To arrive at an expression for the change in the current ﬂow of consump-
tion we ﬁrst diﬀerentiating totally the log of the instantaneous utility and
substitute these terms subsequently into the utility function. The ﬁrst step
yields:
d log un
i
= an
g
eg + aneζ + 1
ε−1
en (A.28)
d log us
i
= ¡as
g
eg ¡ aseζ + 1
ε−1
en, (A.29)
where the coeﬃcients an
g
and an and as
g
and as are deﬁned, respectively, as
an
g
=
n
¡(1¡ νn)
h
ω
n
(h
n
−h
n
i
)
(ω
n
+h
n
)(ω
n
+h
n
i
)
+ ω
n
L
n
H
n
−ag
φn
h
¡ φn
l
i
¡ 1
ε
φn
h
+ φn
h
(1−ζ)
ε[ζθ
−α
+(1−ζ)]
o
ag
H
n
−ag
,
where hn ´ Hn/Ln deﬁnes Northern’s relative factor abundancy and hn ´
Hn
i
/Ln
i
relative factor abundancy of a Northern individual. The variable an
g
captures the endogenous change in variables caused by changes in the rate
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of innovation. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the change in the factor income share;
the second term denotes the change in aggregate expenditure via the change
in factor prices; the third term denotes the change in the production cost of
a variety; the fourth term reﬂects the change in savings; and the last term
reﬂects the change in the terms of trade, keeping ζ and (1¡ ζ) constant. It
can easily be shown that
ωnLn
Hn ¡ agφ
n
h
= φn
l
.
As can be seen from the relative wages in both regions, only the Northern
relative wage changes. This implies that only Northern unit cost of producing
manufactures change which also causes the terms of trade to improve for the
North. The higher unit cost enters negatively while the improved terms of
trade enter positively in the welfare analysis. As it turns out, they are of
equal magnitude and therefore cancel. As a result, an
g
simpliﬁes to
an
g
=
½
¡(1¡ νn)
h
ω
n
(h
n
−h
n
i
)
(ω
n
+h
n
)(ω
n
+h
n
i
)
i
¡ 1
ε
φn
h
+ φn
h
(1−ζ)
ε[ζθ
−α
+(1−ζ)]
¾
ag
H
n
−ag
. (A.30)
In addition
an
θ
= αθ
α
(ε−1)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
> 0,
an
ζ
= ¡ ζ(θα−1)
(ε−1)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
< 0,
an = an
θ
+ an
ζ
The corresponding expressions for the South are
as
g
= αζ
(ε−1)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
φn
h
ag
(H
n
−ag)
> 0
as
θ
= ζ
(ε−1)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
α
(1−ζ)
> 0,
as
ζ
= ¡ ζ(1−θα)
(ε−1)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
> 0,
as = as
θ
+ as
ζ
,
with θ > 1 and pn/ps = θ1/ε, and where we used the relation En = pnxnnn =
(Hn¡ag)/αφn
h
. To derive an expression for the change in life-time utility due
to tighter intellectual property rights of individual i in region k we totally
diﬀerentiate (A.25) as of the time t = 0 and use (A.28) and (A.29):
dUn
i
(0) = an
g
Z
∞
0
eg(τ )e−ρτdτ + an Z ∞
0
eζ(τ )e−ρτdτ + 1
ε−1
Z
∞
0
en(τ)e−ρτdτ
dU s
i
(0) = ¡as
g
Z
∞
0
eg(τ )e−ρτdτ ¡ as Z ∞
0
eζ(τ )e−ρτdτ + 1
ε−1
Z
∞
0
en(τ)e−ρτdτ .
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Note, all integrals are known except the last one. From the deﬁnition of
g ´ .n /n it follows that the number of varieties available at time τ equals
log n(τ ) = log n(0) +
R
τ
0
g(ς)dς, which is used to evaluate the third integral
as follows:R
∞
0
en(τ)e−ρτdτ = dnR∞
0
log n(0)e−ρτdτ +
R
∞
0
hR
t
0
g(ς)dς
i
e−ρτdτ
o
= d
nR
∞
0
log n(0)e−ρτdτ +
R
∞
0
g(ς)
hR
t
0
e−ρτdτ
i
dς
o
= d
nR
∞
0
log n(0)e−ρτdτ +
R
∞
0
g(ς)
ρ
e−ρςdς
o
1
ε−1
R
∞
0
en(τ )e−ρτdτ = 1
ε−1
g
ρ
R
∞
0
eg(ς)e−ρςdς.
Note, when going from the second to the third line we reverse the order of
integration. The change in life time utility is then given by
dUn
i
(0) = an
g
Z
∞
0
eg(τ )e−ρτdτ + an Z ∞
0
eζ(τ )e−ρτdτ + 1
ε−1
g
ρ
Z
∞
0
eg(τ)e−ρτdτ
dU s
i
(0) = ¡as
g
Z
∞
0
eg(τ)e−ρτdτ ¡ as Z ∞
0
eζ(τ )e−ρτdτ + 1
ε−1
g
ρ
Z
∞
0
eg(τ)e−ρτdτ .
This shows that the welfare impact depends on the Laplace transform of the
induced change in the rate of innovation and the share of Northern goods
not yet imitated evaluated at s = ρ :
dUn
i
(0) = an
g
Lfeg, ρg+ anLfeζ, ρg+ 1
ε−1
g
ρ
Lfeg, ρg,
dU s
i
(0) = ¡as
g
Lfeg, ρg¡ asLfeζ, ρg+ 1
ε−1
g
ρ
Lfeg, ρg.
The transition paths for eg(t) and eζ(t) are given by (A.18), so that dU(0) can
be expressed for an individual located in the North and in the South in most
general terms respectively as
(ρ + λ
2
)dUn
i
(0) =
h
g
ρ(ε−1)
+ an
g
i eg(0) + h g
ρ(ε−1)
+ an
g
i
λ
2
ρ
eg(1) + λ2
ρ
aneζ(1)
+ κ
(β+ρ)(λ
1
+β)
h
anB
ζ
+
³
an
g
+ g
ρ(ε−1)
´
B
g
i
(A.31)
and
(ρ+ λ
2
)dU s
i
(0) =
h
g
ρ(ε−1)
¡ as
g
i eg(0) + h g
ρ(ε−1)
¡ as
g
i
λ
2
ρ
eg(1)¡ λ2
ρ
aseζ(1)
¡ κ
(β+ρ)(λ
1
+β)
h
asB
ζ
¡
³
g
ρ(ε−1)
¡ as
g
´
B
g
i
,
(A.32)
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for β 6= λ
2
and B
g
and B
ζ
are deﬁned respectively by
B
g
´ (fa
11
+ βgδ
g
¡ a
21
δ
m
) > 0
B
ζ
´ (fa
22
+ βgδ
m
¡ a
12
δ
g
) < 0.
(A.33)
In the event that the policy shock is unanticipated, i.e. β ! 1, the fourth
expression in dUn
i
(0) and dU s
i
(0) approaches zero.
The signs of B
g
and B
ζ
are determined by making the appropriate sub-
stitutions. We calculate
B
g
´ (Hn−ag)m
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)g
(ρ+ β) > 0,
B
ζ
´ ¡ m
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
n
(g + ρ +m)[φn
h
(νn + α
1−α
ζ) + (1¡ νn)] + (Hn−ag)m
ag
+ β
o
< 0.
Note, the sign of B
g
and B
ζ
is independent of the elasticity of substitution
between factors of production. Expressions (A.31) and (A.32) provide the
basis of our welfare evaluation of tighter IPRs in the South and we proceed
by discussing each welfare expression in turn.
2.1 Welfare analysis for the South [Proof of Proposi-
tion 2]
Making use of as
g
, as
θ
and as
ζ
coeﬃcients, (A.11) and (A.14) the expression of
the change in life-time utility due to a change in the regime of intellectual
property rights for the South if the shock is announced amounts to
(ρ+ λ
2
)dU s(0) = ¡ κ(Hn−ag)m
ρ(ε−1)λ
1
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
h
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
i
+as
g
κ(H
n
−ag)m
λ
1
ag(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
h
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
i
¡ ζλ2α
(ε−1)ρ[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
](1−ζ)
eζ(1)
¡ ζλ2(θα−1)
(ε−1)ρ[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
eζ(1).
The ﬁrst line shows the eﬀect of product availability on welfare, which is
negative. The initial increase in the amounts of varieties available is more
than compensated by its subsequent drop. In case consumer value varieties
per se their ﬂow of utility decreases eventually. The second line reﬂects the
change in Southern terms of trade holding constant the weights ζ(t) and
[1 ¡ ζ(t)]. The change in relative prices is brought about by changes in the
rate of innovation and by the change in the number of goods produced in the
North. The initial increase in the rate of innovation leads to a deterioration
of South’s terms of trade while the subsequent drop in the rate of innovation
leads to an improvement. In present value terms the improvement in the
16
terms of trade due to changes in the rate of innovation is positive. However,
this is counteracted by higher Northern prices due to the increased demand
for labor of the manufacturing sector generated by a higher fraction of goods
produced there. This renders the total eﬀect on welfare ambiguous. The
following lemma, however, establishes that the overall welfare eﬀect of the
terms of trade is negative for the South. The third line denotes the eﬀect
of the changes in the interregional allocation of production on welfare, i.e.
changes in ζ(t) holding relative prices constant. This last eﬀect is negative
since θ > 1.
Lemma 4 Let
κ(H
n
−ag)m
λ
1
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
h
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
i
as
g
¡ ζλ2α
(ε−1)ρ[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
](1−ζ)
eζ(1) < 0 (A.34)
and it follows that dU s(0) < 0.
Proof. Making use of the deﬁnition of as
g
and ζ(1), (A.34) implies
ρ(1¡ ζ)φ
h
< (λ
1
+ g +m)
£
φ
h
νn + α
1−α
φ
h
+ (1¡ νn)¤)
λ
1
(1¡ ζ)φ
h
< (λ
1
+ g +m)
£
φ
h
νn + α
1−α
φ
h
+ (1¡ νn)¤
which, in turn, implies
λ
1
m[φ
l
(1¡ νn)+ α
1¡ αφh] + (gλ1+(g+m)
2)[φ
h
(νn+
α
1¡ α)+ (1¡ ν
n] > 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2(i).
This result is in accordance with the one derived by Helpman (1993).
Matters are slightly more involved if the policy is introduced gradually,
i.e. β < 1, since the transition term now becomes relevant. Combining
(A.32), (A.33), and making the appropriate substitutions the discounted ﬂow
of Southern utility when the shock is implemented gradually amounts to
(ρ+ λ
2
)dU s
a
(0) =
β
(λ
1
+ β)
(ρ + λ
2
)dU s(0)
¡ β
(λ
1
+ β)
as
ρ(β + ρ)
h
λ
1
λ
2
eζ(1)¡ κmρi , (A.35)
where
as =
ζα
(ε¡ 1)ρ [ζ + (1¡ ζ)θα] (1¡ ζ)
+
ζλ
2
(θα ¡ 1)
(ε¡ 1)ρ [ζ + (1¡ ζ)θα] > 0.
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Lemma 5 h
λ
1
λ
2
eζ(1)¡ κmρi > 0.
Proof. Direct substitution for eζ(1) and rearranging gives
(g + ρ+m) fφ
h
(ε¡ 1)ζg+ (g +m)(1¡ φ
l
νn) +
(Hn ¡ ag)m
ag
> 0.
We next show that the welfare losses experienced by the South are smaller
the more gradual IPRs are tightened.
Lemma 6
(ρ+ λ
2
)dU s
a
(0) > (ρ + λ
2
)dU s(0).
Proof.
(ρ+ λ
2
) [dU s
a
(0)¡ dU s(0)] = ¡ λ1
λ
1
+β
(ρ + λ
2
)dU s(0)
¡ β
(λ
1
+β)ρ(ρ+β)
h
λ
1
λ
2
eζ(1)¡ κmρi
which is, ceteris paribus, more likely to be positive the lower is β
¡λ
1
(ρ + λ
2
)dU s(0) >
β
ρ(ρ+ β)
h
λ
1
λ
2
eζ(1)¡ κmρi .
This completes the proof of Proposition 2(ii).
2.2 Welfare analysis for the North [Proof of Proposi-
tion 3]
2.2.1 Change in aggregate Northern welfare
Next we turn to the change in aggregate Northern welfare, concentrating ﬁrst
on tje eﬀect when the policy shock is introduced without announcement (β !
1). Note, we use aggregate expenditure En in our calculations implying that
the income share eﬀect is zero. In this case the change in life-time utility is
given by
(ρ+ λ
2
)dUn(0) = ¡ κ(Hn−ag)m
ρ(ε−1)λ
1
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
+ κmφh
λ
1
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)ε
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
¡ κm
λ
1
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
φ
h
(1−ζ)θ
α
ε[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
+ λ2
ρ
an
θ
eζ(1)
¡ λ2ζ(θα−1)
(ε−1)ρ[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
eζ(1).
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The ﬁrst line represents the eﬀect on product availability; the second line
reﬂects the change in savings pattern; the third line denotes the change in
the terms of trade, holding constant weights ζ(t) and (1¡ ζ(t)). The change
in the terms of trade is caused by a shift in the rate of innovation and the
change in the share of varieties not yet imitated. The last line denotes the
interregional product allocation eﬀect holding constant relative prices.
As shown by Helpman (1993), the negative product variety eﬀect is larger
than the change in the savings pattern and for rates of imitation close to zero,
the negative production allocation eﬀect more than compensates the positive
terms of trade eﬀect. We ﬁrst show that the welfare loss on account of the
variety eﬀect is larger than the welfare gain on account of adjustments in
savings and R&D investments rates, or
κm(ρ+g+m)
λ
1
(1−φ
l
ν
n
)ε(λ
1
+g+m)
h
φn
h
¡ (Hn−ag)
aρα
i
< 0
if and only if
g <
Hn
a
¡ ραφn
h
.
or
g < [φ
h
(ε¡ 1) + 1] (1¡ α)g
(m=0)
+ α
Hn
a
where g
(m=0)
is the steady state rate of innovation when the rate of imitation
is zero. Since the rate of innovation increases with the rate of imitation, the
last inequality holds.
Next we show that the welfare loss due to the reallocation of production
more than compensates the welfare gain on account of improved terms of
trade for small rates of imitation.
Lemma 7 For m suﬃciently small
φ
n
h
(1−ζ)θ
α
ε[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
ag
(H
n
−ag)
eg(0) + λ2
ρ
eg(1)¸+ an
θ
λ
2
ρ
eζ(1) + an
ζ
λ
2
ρ
eζ(1) < 0.
Proof. From the deﬁnition of an
g
, an
θ
, an
ζ
, (A.11) and (A.14) it follows that
κm(ρ+g+m)θ
α
λ
1
(1−φ
l
ν
n
)[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]ε
Γ
1
,
where
Γ
1
´
n
¡ φnh(1−ζ)
(λ
1
+g+m)
+ 1
ρ
³
1¡ ζ(1−θ−α)
α
´
£[φ
h
(νn + α
1−α
ζ) + (1¡ νn)] + (1¡ ζ) α
1−α
φ
h
ª
.
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In order to determine the sign of Γ
1
we look at its limiting behavior when
m! 0, implying ζ ! 1 and θα !1. It follows that
¡ κm(ρ+ g +m)θ
α
λ
1
[ζ + (1¡ ζ)θα]ε
(1¡ α)
α(1¡ φ
l
νn)ρ
[(1¡ φn
l
νn) +
α
1¡ αφ
n
h
] < 0.
This proves that the negative production allocation eﬀect more than compen-
sates the positive terms of trade eﬀect for suﬃciently small rates of imitation.
As a result, Northern countries lose from tighter intellectual property rights
for small rates of imitation. 
We next derive the welfare expression when the policy is introduced grad-
ually, i.e. β < 1. Combining (A.31), (A.33) and making the appropriate
substitutions the discounted ﬂow of utility for the North when the shock is
announced is given by
(ρ + λ
2
)dUn
a
(0) =
β
β + λ
1
f(ρ+ λ
2
)dUn(0)
+
an
θ
+ an
ζ
ρ(β + ρ)
h
λ
1
λ
2
eζ(1)¡ κmρi¾ , (A.36)
where an
θ
> 0 and an
ζ
< 0, and the squared bracketed terms is positive by
Lemma 5. To determine the sign of (A.36) we look at the limiting behavior
of an
θ
> 0 and an
ζ
< 0 when m! 0. It is easily shown that
an
θ
+ an
ζ
< 0
for m suﬃciently small. Following the line of argument used in Lemma 6,
for m suﬃciently small, the welfare losses for the North is smaller the lower
is β.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
2.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
When the production function is of Leontief type, the change in Northern
welfare for individual i is given by
(ρ+ λ
2
)dUn
i
(0) = ¡ κ(Hn−ag)m
ρ(ε−1)λ
1
a(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
+
κmφ
n
h
λ
1
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)ε
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
¡ κmφnh
λ
1
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
(1−ζ)θ
α
ε[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´
+ λ2
ρ
an
θ
eζ(1)
¡ λ2ζ(θα−1)
(ε−1)ρ[ζ+(1−ζ)θ
α
]
eζ(1).
+
n
(1−ν
n
)
(1−φ
n
l
ν
n
)
ω
n
(h
n
−h
n
i
)
(ω
n
+h
n
)(ω
n
+h
n
i
)
κm
λ
1
³
ρ+g+m
λ
1
+g+m
´o
.
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For νn ! ¡1, (1¡ νn)/(1¡ φn
l
νn)! 1 iﬀ (Hn ¡ ag)/Ln < 1 and
ωn(hn ¡ hn
i
)
(ωn + hn)(ωn + hn
i
)
! 0.
As a consequence, the last term approaches zero so that the sign of (ρ +
λ
2
)dUn(0) is determined by the previous eﬀects. Applying L’Hôpital to the
income share expression proves the second part of Proposition.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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